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“You know what I’m saying?”
A sociolinguistic critique on free speech theories and tests.





I.

John was on his way to school last Friday. He was really worried about the math lesson.
Last week he had been unable to control the class.
It was unfair of the math teacher to leave him in charge.
After all, it is not a normal part of a janitor’s duties1

INTRODUCTION

Communication: it is one of the most critical aspects of human development and
necessary for society’s flourishing. For almost all of human history the primary medium in
which people have communicated is speech.2 Whether it is accomplished through a stimulation
of vocal cords coordinated with the movements of the mouth or the use of hands, it is the default
tool individuals use to converse ideas.3 Governments throughout the world have frequently
punished thoughts and words deemed illegal.4 Despite, and perhaps because of speech’s
omnipresence, the study of what constitutes speech and the units of language only began in
earnest in the nineteenth century.5 Thus, the genesis of modern linguistics occurred when
Thomas Jefferson was in his second Presidential term. However, eighteen years earlier the

1

GEORGE YULE, T HE STUDY OF LANGUAGE , 146-7(2d1996) (1985). This example shows how language relies on
culturally held schemata to express itself. A schema is a cognitive frame, an organized body of information used to
process and interpret incoming information. It enables us to quickly sort through large quantities of disparate data,
to “separate the wheat from the chaff,” selecting what is salient to understanding the situation, and ignoring what is
judged not to be salient.
2
R.L. TRASK, LANGUAGE THE BASICS, 2 (2d2004). It has been estimated that there are 6,000-7,000 living languages
presently. However, forty percent of all languages are in danger of extinction by 2100. Matt McGrath, Goodbye
Mother Tongue, BBC (Jan. 24, 1999) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/sci/tech/specials/anaheim_99/262145.stm.
3
In the twenty-first century about one fifth of the world’s adult population, 770 million, is illiterate. EFA Global
Monitoring Report, EDUCATION FOR ALL LITERACY IS LIFE (2006) available
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001416/141639e.pdf.
4
Socrates trial for failing to acknowledge the gods that the city acknowledges" and "introducing new deities"
essentially punished his freedom of speech. In 1350s, King Edward signed an Act making it illegal to “compass or
imagine the Death of our Lord the King.” The Treason Act, 25 Edw. 3 Stat 5 c2 (1352) (Eng.).
5
The examination of languages at the morphological level,, was not begun until the nineteenth century. JACOB
GRIMM, DEUTSCHE GRAMMATIK (German Grammar) (2d ed. 1822). Before this language was often described
descriptively and Hebrew often thought of as the “original” language. WINFRED P. LEHMANN, HISTORICAL
LINGUISTICS, 26 (3d ed. 1992) (1962).
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founding fathers enshrined in the Bill of Rights the words “Congress shall make no
law…abridging the freedom of speech.”6 The shape and contour of what those few words mean7
in context is an issue judicial opinions and academics have debated for generations. 8
Several unique and conflicting free speech theories and tests have developed— each with
drawbacks that cannot be reconciled with American free speech jurisprudence. For instance, in
the early Republic the legal privileges associated with free speech were not clear and highly
influenced by political affiliation.9 Nonetheless, some academics and justices have tried to
reconstruct an original understanding. The reconstructed originalist free speech jurisprudence,
however, is incompatible with several “categories” of free speech liberties enjoyed today and
consequently this model has not been widely accepted.10 In contrast to the limited originalist
free speech approach is the all-inclusive free speech absolutism. Here, market control forces
would be the backbone of free speech jurisprudence and no speech would be per se limited.11
While many twentieth century free speech cases set forth grand visions of what free
speech protects, the Court has never adopted a posture of absolute protection for speech.
Seemingly by default, most twentieth and twentieth first century jurisprudence relies on a
categorical approach or balancing approach where the protections afforded specific speech acts
are determined by an evaluation and judgment of what the speech act is.12 The categorical
approach, where decisions on whether speech acts are protected or not is decided by a judicial
system of categories, is neither a unifying free speech theory nor reliant on stare decisis. The
6

U.S. CONST. AMEND. 1 § 4.
As will be discussed in detail all words are arbitrary and only have the meaning assigned to them by a person or
group of people. The meaning of which changes over time because language itself is not a static entity.
8
“Context” is an ambiguous word here encompassing many different “contexts” including word context, social
context, the thoughts of the writer, the medium used, the thoughts of the reader in 1790, and the thoughts of the
modern reader.
9
See infra Part III A.
10
Id.
11
See infra Part III B.
12
See infra Part III B, C.
7
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categories are inherently arbitrary and created when the Court faces a speech act which is not
perceived by the Court to comport with existing case law. The balancing test, where the interest
in the speech act is tempered against state interests, is similarly subject to judicial arbitrariness.
Those speech theories and tests cannot adequately describe American free speech ideas because
they lack a component necessary to understand speech: culture.
The failure to create a viable, integrated free speech theory or test consistent with the
entire body of case law has its roots in the shortcomings of the science of speech. The founding
fathers and political theorists of that era were working with an incomplete and inaccurate
definition of the most important word in the free speech clause—speech. In the founding era, the
most scientific explanation of speech concentrated on the performance of speech and did not
comprehend the many components of speech acts below the surface. Indeed, that explanation
failed to recognize that:
[speech is] the power of articulate utterance, the power of
expressing thoughts by vocal cords; language, words considered as
expressing thoughts; particular languages as distinct from others;
anything spoken; talk, mention; oration, harangue.13
That definition does include a few of the basic linguistic features of speech as the
locutionary act, i.e. the performance of speech,14 and language as a medium of thought.15

13

Thomas Sheridan, A complete dictionary of the English language, both with regard to sound and meaning One
main Object of which is, to establish a plain and permanent standard of pronunciation, Volume 2 (fourth edition, 2
volumes )(1797). The spellings have been modernized to make the definition more approachable for the modern
reader. Generally, using a dictionary to define what a word meant in a given era is itself a flawed practice.
Dictionary writers were prescriptionits, believers in true and correct word usage, and often were slow to record
changes in word usage inconsistent with the ‘true meaning.’ Dictionary recorders often neglected slang and vulgar
words. The subtitle to this dictionary includes this failing: Since the culture in the founding fathers lived in long
extinct the dictionary is the best surviving record. For a comparison of this definition with the American Webster’s
first edition see infra n. 146 at 37.
14
JOHN L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS, 101 (1962). Before J.L. Austin’s work the study of linguistics
was concerned with finding truth values. However that theory failed to consider a great range of speech
performances.
15
LEV VYGOTSKY, THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE, (1962) (genesis of the theory on inter-relationship of language
development and thought); D Gentner, Why we’re so smart, in LANGUAGE IN MIND ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF
LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT (eds. Genter & S. Goldin-Meadow) (195-236) (2003).
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Nonetheless, the definition fails to recognize the prelocutionary act, i.e. the effect on the
listener,16 the sociolinguistic features, and the illocutionary effect.17 While all of those missing
features of speech are critical to the linguist, it is the missing sociolinguistic aspect which is of
paramount importance to the legal field. Language and speech do not exist in a vacuum. The
relationship of language to society is key to understanding free speech in America.
This paper attempts to foster a more complete understanding of speech in the First
Amendment jurisprudence using modern linguistic theory as a catalyst for a new balancing test.
By considering culture and societal expectations, the paper sets forth a unified test for free
speech jurisprudence without the inconsistencies of other theories or tests. The proposed test
puts the emphasis of free speech back on the speech act itself. Part II of the paper is a primer of
the relevant linguistics studies, which briefly explains the components behind speech acts and
why sociolinguistics is critical to American jurisprudence. Part III describes major existing
theories and tests of free speech and discusses their weakness in practice. In Part IV the paper
presents a new test for free speech jurisprudence which explains the present case law as
consistent with perceived societal norms and recommends future free speech issues determine
the cultural acceptance of the speech acts intention. Finally, Part V addresses potential weakness
the proposed test may encounter and postulates on avenues a court may take to avoid such
weaknesses.
II.

WITHOUT AN UNDERSTANDING OF CULTURE SPEECH HAS
LITTLE MEANING
A. SPEECH DEVELOPMENT IS INFLUENCED BY LANGUAGE AND
CULTURE

16

JOHN L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS, 101 (1962).
The definition of an illocutionary act has vexed linguists for generations, but has several accepted examples. For
instance, the sentence: “I bequeath my Alfa Romeo to my brother Matt” is not describing what has been done, but is
used to perform the idea—a performative illocutionary act.
17
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Speech and culture are distinct entities that are innately entwined and necessary for
comprehension of the utterance. Before examining the effect of culture on speech acts a basic
understanding of speech mechanics is necessary. Moreover, because some Justices have used
originalsim in the First Amendment context, understanding the differences in linguistic
understanding from the founding to the modern era is important. A modern definition of the
speech act has several linguistics features unknown in 1790:
Any of the acts that may be performed by a speaker in making an utterance, as
stating, asking, requesting, advising, warning, or persuading, considered in terms
of the content of the message, the intention of the speaker, and the effect on the
listener.18
In other words, the speech act is utterance as behavior; the idea that talking is ‘doing
things with words.’19 From its definition, the speech act can be divided into three main
components. The first component is the locutionary act, the actual utterance and its ostensible
meaning, comprising a phonetic act corresponding to the verbal, syntactic and semantic aspects
of any meaningful utterance.20 This is the aspect of speech commonly thought of as speech and
consequently known in 1790.21 The second is the illuctionary act, which can be further
categorized as the illuctoinary point, the basic purpose or intent of the speaker,22 and the
particular schemata that must accompany that point.23 Critically, schemata, which are of
paramount importance to successful communication, were poorly understood until the twentieth

18

Random House, Dictionary.com Unabridged (Mar. 21 2013).
<Dictionary.com http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/speech act> It should be noted the use of the more
scientific speech act then the vernacular speech. A speech act is the first meaning given to vernacular speech in a
dictionary. To avoid ambiguity with the alternative definitions of speech, speech act is used for precision.
Compare modern definition to 1790s definition. See supra n. 14 at 4.
19
The title of John Austin’s legendary book.
20
JOHN L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS, (1962).
21
See n. 13 at 4.
22
SEARLE, JOHN, AND DANIEL VANDERVEKEN. FOUNDATIONS OF ILLOCUTIONARY LOGIC, 13-15 (1985).
23
DAVID CRYSTAL, A FIRST DICTIONARY OF LINGUISTICS AND PHONETICS, 152 (1980); SEARLE, JOHN, AND DANIEL
VANDERVEKEN. FOUNDATIONS OF ILLOCUTIONARY LOGIC, 7-9, 20-1 (1985).
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century.24 Lastly, the third major component, which may not always be present, is the
perlocutionary act, the accentual result of the utterance, which includes “persuading, convincing,
scaring, enlightening, inspiring, or otherwise getting someone to do or realize something,
whether intended or not.”25 A failure of the locutionary or illuctionary acts can cause undesired
perlocutionary results and frustrate the purpose of communication. Together these three
components in combination with the knowledge of whom the speaker, the hearer, and the context
of the utterance is, create a speech act.
While the mechanics of speech may seem unfamiliar, the underlying tenets are already
taught and used in legal work. The three mechanical speech components can be easily
understood through analogy in American jurisprudence. Suppose that in the jurisdiction of
Setonia aggravated murder is defined “to purposefully kill a person with a hammer.”
“Purposefully” would be the mens rea element, “killing” would be the actus reus element, and
“with a hammer” would be the circumstantial element. Together these three elements complete
the crime aggravated murder. In the analogy, the illocutionary act is akin to the mens rea
element, the locutionary element the actus reus, and the perlocutioary act the circumstantial
element. Thus, the speech act can easily be understood by the legal community. Like a criminal
or civil offense, the background facts and assumptions surrounding the person’s acts, intent, and
circumstances alter our perception of the event. In the speech act context, the “facts and
assumptions” that underpin a person’s understanding of speech and ultimately “freedom of
speech” are cultural.

24

WILLIAM LABOV, Hypercorrection by the lower middle class as a factor in linguistic change, in
SOCIOLINGUISTICS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE UCLA SOCIOLINGUISTICS CONFERENCE 84-113 (ed. William Bright 1966).
25
J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS, 3 (2d ed. 1975).
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B. SOCIOLINGUISTICS IS CRITICAL TO FREE SPEECH
JURISPRUDENCE BECAUSE CULTURE IS ESSENTIAL TO
DECODNG LANGUAGE
Speech cannot be communicated and understood effectively without the speaker and
recipient sharing common culture. While the components of a speech act are universal, the
channels of speech acts—languages—employ startlingly different approaches to
communication.26 In short, a language is a “method of human communication, either spoken or
written, consisting of the use of words in a structured and conventional way.”27 In any language
the meaningful utterances28 are relatively consistent29 and shared by members of the speech
community.30 Nevertheless, if an individual were to memorize a dictionary and learn all the
meaningful utterances in a specific language, that individual would not be successful in the given
speech community. The reason, which is critical to free speech, is “language [or speech] cannot
be understood if we do not have any idea of the conditions [by] which the people who use it

26

For instance, English is a Germanic language of the Indo-European language family. It has article words and
relies on clusters of modifying words around a verb for clarification. This is in stark contrast to Cherokee where
there are no articles and the verbs themselves contain a nucleus which is then modified by extra syllables to modify
the root. So the English sentence, He was speaking (I heard him myself), can be said in Cherokee in one word, kame-gunh-gi. RUTH BRADLEY HOLMES & BETTY SHARP SMITH, BEGINNING CHEROKEE , v ( 2d. ed. 1976).
27
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2013) available http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/language;accord DAVID CRYSTAL, THE CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE , 3 (1995).
28
In two noteworthy studies, the manner in which North American mothers and Japanese mothers talk to their
children in early development. The study found Japanese mothers, where the culture negatively views taking a great
deal, do not ask for elaborations from their children when recalling past events. Japanese mothers’ would also
interrupt their children with brief acknowledgements from talking at length. Conversely, the North American
mothers,’ whose culture generally values articulate and verbally expressiveness, frequently asked questions to
encourage their children to talk. The Japanese and North American mothers thus taught positive societal values to
their children through language. M. Minami, A. McCabe, Rice balls and bear hunts: Japanese and North American
family narrative, J. of Child Language, 22, 423-446; P. Clancy, The acquisition of communicative style in Japanese,
in LANGUAGE ACQUISITION ACROSS CULTURES, 213-50 (eds B.B. Schieffelin & E. Ochs) (1986); see also P. Clancy
The acquisition of Japanese in THE CROSSLINGUISTIC STUDY OF LANGUAGE ACQUISITION, 373-525 (ed. D. I. Slobin)
(1985).
29
The popular notion of language as a stable and universal instrument among a speck group is incorrect. For
example there is no true proper English. There are dozens of different English dialects none of which are better than
any other. The perception of one dialect i.e. American Standard English (ASE) being better than African American
Vernacular English (AVVE) is a cultural issue. Robert A. Leonard, Black English Equals Any Other Language,
January 22, 2003 A29 Newsday.
30
Cheng Githiora, Sheng: Peer language, Swahili dialect or emerging Creole?, J. OF AFRICAN CULTURAL STUDIES,
159-181 (2002).
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live.”31 When analyzing speech acts at the language level, studies have shown that culture and
any language is inseparably linked studies have even shown language influences the way humans
think.32 This cultural aspect of speech has been frequently overlooked by the court.
The information structure of language is multifaceted, unapparent, and below the surface
of normal analysis. Language is inherently arbitrary and a blunt instrument requiring the listener
and speaker to accommodate one another for successful communication.33 Thus, every language
requires speech communities to use shared schemata to decipher inherit ambiguity.34 For
example, a North Korean who learned English and who heard the following joke would need to
know several American schemata that are never taught in the classroom:
Why are blonde jokes only one line long?
So men can remember them.35
In order to understand the joke, the listener must understand several encoded cultural
specific assumptions or schemata. First, the listener must know that “blonde” refers to women.
Secondly, the listener must decode the schemata presuppositions for both “dumb blondes” and
“dumb blond jokes.” Finally, to understand the joke itself, the listener must recognize the
challenge to the schema—i.e. men are actually the butt of the joke to understand the intent of the
sender. All of these presumptions must be rapidly and readily understood by the receiver or the

31

ANTONIE MEILLET, LA METHODE COMPARATIVE EN LINGUISTIQUE HISTORIQUE, 10 (1925) translated by G.B. ford
Jr (1967).
32
Lera Boroditsky et al., Sex, syntax and semantics, in LANGUAGE IN MIND: ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE
AND THOUGHT (61-80) (eds. D. Gentner & S. Goldin-Meadow 2003). (Study found that participants who spoke
languages with grammatical genders were asked to describe certain objects that the adjectives they chose depended
on the gendered category of the nouns in their native language.
33
See Generally Language Accommodation Theory, which explores how people interact and adjust their speech,
their vocal patterns and their gestures, context, and identity to accommodate to others. CYNDY GALLOIS, TANIA
GILES, HOWARD JOHNSON, Communication Accommodation Theory: A look back and a Look Ahead, in WILLIAM B.
GUDYKUNST, THEORIZING ABOUT INTERCULTRUAL COMMUNICATION, 122-148 (2010); LYNN H. TURNER, RICHARD
WEST, INTRODUCING COMMUNICATION THEORY: ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION (4th 2010).
34
Richard C. Anderson & P. David Pearson , A Schema-Theoretic View Of Basic Processes In Reading
Comprehension, in HANDBOOK OF READING RESEARCH (eds P. David Pearson & Rebecca Barr) 255-289.
35
Compare to the opening epigram supra n.1 at 1.
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purpose of the speech act is defeated. Speech cannot be completely analyzed without the
comprehension of culture.
What qualifies as good, i.e. a prestigious dialect, bad, i.e. a powerless dialect, and
inappropriate speech, i.e. using language that is inappropriate for the social situation, is marked
by cultural understandings.36 Sociolinguistics examines language and its relation to social
factors including class, occupation, gender, regionalization, pidgin languages, polyglots or the
ability to speak multiple languages.37 In language, acceptable (i.e., “protected”) speech depends
on a variety of factors including the person, place, and intent of the listener. Obviously, the
language choices speakers make in a bar are not the same choices the speakers would make with
their mother. Akin to the “blonde joke,” the sociolinguistic choices involve more than mere word
choice. Speech necessarily elicits certain schemata demonstrating the groups speakers belong to
and the message itself.38 Without knowing the speech acts cultural or subcultural substrata,
categorizing the message’s intent is dangerous. In the First Amendment context, most of the
speech tests do not overtly consider the cultural underpinnings of speech. Yet, it is speech’s
cultural underpinnings that have caused most free speech cases and is the reason why speech is
difficult to regulate.
The majority opinion in Citizens United v. FEC, did not consider the cultural speech act
norms in the United States.39 In Citizens United, the majority concluded that the Bipartisan
36

William Labov, The effect of social mobility on linguistic behavior, in EXPLORATIONS IN
(ed. Stanley Lieberson 1966) (A landmark field-study on the effect of a place and social
status on word and dialect choice).
37
JANET HOLMES, AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLINGUISTICS, 1 (2d. ed. 2002) (1992).
38
William Labov, The logic of non-standard English in PIER PALO GIGLIOLI, LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL CONTEXT
179-215 (1972). For instance, in AAVE, a dialect of English primarily used by African Americans in northeaster
cities, certain linguistic features deviate from Standard English. If a non-speaker were to try to imitate the dialect the
person would almost certainly make several errors showing the listener they do not know the dialect. For codeswitching, between, dialects and languages see John. J. Gumprez, The Sociolinguist Significance of Code Switching,
RELC JOURNAL 8, 2: 1-34 (1977).
39
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
SOCIOLINGUISTICS 186-203
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Campaign Reform Act of 2002’s restriction prohibiting corporations, unions, and not-for-profit
organizations from broadcasting electioneering communications within sixty days of a general
election or thirty days of a primary election violated the free speech clause.40 The majority
opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, spent a majority of its time analyzing case law and the
appellant’s and respondent’s legal arguments. While, the opinion briefly comments on the intent
of the speech act, the identity of the speaker, and what medium is used, it fails to discuss
American culture surrounding corporate speech.41 Instead of examining the present
sociolinguistic features of American speech, the Court discussed the culture of free speech in the
founding era.42
The decision reached by the Court was not in accord with the general speech community
in the United States. Immediately after the Court’s decision was announced the public reaction
to the central holding was overwhelmingly critical.43 The reaction to the Court decision
highlights the hazards faced when the court does not consider the present American culture
surrounding speech acts. Speech cannot be understood without the markings and accepted
schemata of the given culture, and culture must be analyzed in the free speech context. When a
court fails to consider the contours of accepted speech in the community it risks conclusions
which are incompatible with the commonly held expectations of the speech communities it
serves.
III.

40

EXISTING FREE SPEECH THEORIES FAIL TO COHESIVELY UNIFY
CASE LAW AND INSTEAD CREATE AMBIGUITY

Id. at 913.
Id. at 890.
42
Id. at 906. For analysis see supra III A at 11.
43
Dan Eggan, THE WASHINGTON POST, Large Majority opposes Supreme Court’s decision on campaign financing,
available: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/17/AR2010021701151.html (finding
65% of Americans strongly disagree with Citizen’s United and 72% are in favor of some restrictions on corporate
money in elections).
41
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A. ORIGINALIST FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE FAILS TO
RECOGNIZE MODERN SPEECH ACT STANDARDS AND
CONSTRUCTS.
Creating a test from a free speech originalist understanding is a thorny proposition due to
the variable opinion on the propriety of so doing, the lack of case law, and the poorly understood
concept of speech in the founder’s era. Before the American Revolution there were several
different theories on what qualified as protected speech. One of the most influential legal
influences on free speech was Judge Blackstone who stated:
[t]he liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free
state; but this consists in laying no previous restrains upon
publication and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter
when published. Every free man has an undoubted right to lay
what sentiments’ he pleases before the public; to forbid this is to
destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is
improper, mischievous or illegal he must take the consequences of
his own temerity.44
Here, Blackstone formed vague and arbitrary categories of “improper,” “mischievous,” and
“illegal” speech that would not be protected. Consequently, the limits on speech acts Judge
Blackstone suggested were highly contingent on cultural schemata on what would be improper
and would curtail speech protections in incalculable ways. However, the study of cultural
schemata which underlay determinations of what is “improper” was not studied in the mid
eighteenth century. For example, in English interactions with Native Americans, explorers
frequently mistook Native American laws and customs as savage.45 The explores had a

44

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND ch. II, 150-153 (1765-1769). Significantly
although not quoted nearly as much, Blackstone stated further “blasphemous, immoral, treasonable, schismatical,
seditious, or scandalous libels” are not protected. This caveat is inconsistent with the First Amendment and
demonstrates the difficulties of relying on textual information from a culture which does not comport to the present
culture.
45
A perfect illustration of the English and American difficulty in separating their analysis of other cultures from
their own sociolinguistic culture in this era is in Sir Henry Timberlake’s book on his time among the Cherokee in the
early eighteenth century. Timberlake first described the Cherokee as “savage unacquainted with the laws of war nor
nations” but also as a people to admire: “here is a lesson to Europe; two Indian chiefs, whom we call barbarians,
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difficulty understanding Native American laws and customs for they could not separate their
analysis from their deeply embedded cultural schemata on what was “good or improper.”
Blackstone’s understanding of protected speech, cloaked in the aura of free press and
determinations of cultural schemata he did not fully understand, cannot be said to have been
universally held by the founding fathers.
The battle between federalists and anti-federalists over the Alien Sedition Act’s
constitutionality clearly shows the bitter divide over free speech protections.46 Nowhere was the
struggle to define free speech more pronounced than Virginia. There, three celebrated
Americans offered contrasting free speech views in the Virginia House of Delegates. Writing for
the Anti-Federalists majority, Madison and Jefferson stated that “the two last cases of the ‘Alien
and Sedition acts,’ passed at the last session of Congress; the first of which exercises a power no
where (sic) delegated to the Federal Government.”47 The legislative act shows that two of
America’s founding fathers did not share Blackstone’s understanding of free speech—at least in

rivals of power…yet these have no farther animosity, no family quarrels. HENRY TIMBERLAKE, THE MEMOIRS OF LT.
HENRY TIMBERLAKE: THE STORY OF A SOLDIER, ADVENTURER, AND EMISSARY TO THE CHEROKEES, 1756-1765 8, 37
(Ed. Duane H. King. 2007) (1765). Timberland never contemplated that Native American cultures developed their
own laws and jus cogens standards for he could not see past his cultural schemata. Thus, he could recognize the
effects of Cherokee law on the actions of the Cherokee towards one another, but could not comprehend it came from
their own laws. He assumed the attitudes they exhibited towards one another derived from the nature of man, not
from any moral or legal code. Jason Curreri, Sins of Our Forefathers: How the Cherokee Efforts to Reform Their
Property Laws Led To Their Removal at the Bayonet of Euro-Americans, 7 (May 2012) (unpublished J.D. thesis,
Seton Hall Law) (on file with author). This deficiency in sociolinguistic analysis highlights one of the problems
which come with an originalist test in the modern era.
46
William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of A Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91,
123 (1984). The Alien and Sedition Act made it illegal to:
write, print, utter or publish ... any false, scandalous and malicious writing
or writings against the government of the United States, or either House of
Congress ... or the President ... or to bring them ... into contempt or disrepute.
Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596, 596.
47
Virginia to Wit. In the House of Delegates Friday, December 21st, 1798. Resolved that the General Assembly of
Virginia doth unequivocally express a firm resolution . . . . Richmond, 1798. In Rare Book and Special Collections
Division, Library of Congress available:
http://www.myloc.gov/Exhibitions/creatingtheus/BillofRights/FormationofPoliticalParties/ExhibitObjects/VirginiaR
esolutionsOpposeAlienSeditionLaws.aspx
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1798. Earlier in 1777, with Jefferson’s support, Virginia passed a law to punish traitors in
thought, but not in deed against the American cause.48 Similarly, Madison switched his stance to
supporting the Bill of Rights after two election losses.49
The liberty associated with free speech was equally unclear in the Virginian Federalist
party. In response to the Anti-Federalists legislation, John Marshall, then a Virginian legislator,
wrote that the Alien Sedition Acts were constitutional.50 At first blush this does not seem
irregular, but Marshall’s actual opinion on the act may have been contrary to his response. In a
Virginian newspaper the future Chief Justice wrote:
I am not an advocate for the alien and sedition bills had I been in
Congress when they passed I should…certainly opposed them
because I think them useless; and because they are calculated to
create unnecessary disconnects and jealousies.51
Thus, like Madison and Jefferson, Marshall altered his earlier position on the protections offered
by the First Amendment. Moreover, the Marshall Court never addressed free speech in any
cases leaving his jurisprudence on the issue unknown.
Due to the uncertainty surrounding speech and publishing liberties afforded in the early
Republic reconstructed originalist position. In contemporary First Amendment context, Justice
Thomas has been the largest proponent of an originalist perspective. Justice Thomas’
concurrence in Morse v. Frederick, stated his conclusion that students in public schools have no

LEONARD LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 30 (1964). This law is reminiscent of King Edward’s law see
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free speech rights.52 In this case an 18 year old student at a school event unfurled a banner with
the message “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”53 A 5-4 majority found that the speech was not protected
under the First Amendment.54 Justice Thomas’ concurrence, not joined by any other members of
the Court, tried to reconstruct an originalist “free speech” doctrine for students. As Vikram
Amar has summarized, Justice Thomas’ opinion asserts that the free student speech rights should
be assessed as originally understood and that at the nation’s founding schools were managed
with an iron hand.55 Ultimately, Justice Thomas concludes that “in my view…history does not
suggest” students have a free speech right.56 To reach this originalist conclusion, Justice Thomas
did not cite any statements of the founding fathers.57 Instead, he principally relied on 19th
century historical analysis and cases, somewhat undermining the originalist position.58
The originalist reasoning exemplified in Morse is ultimately unconvincing and not a
viable free speech theory. The methodology employed has two major shortcomings, which
cannot be reconciled with linguistic principles. The first shortcoming is that to reach an
originalist conclusion on whether a speech act is protected Justice Thomas does not rely on or
discuss the founding fathers opinions. This omission is likely because the differing and changing
opinions on free speech by men like Jefferson and Marshall undermine a definitive
determination. To avoid confronting the diverging opinions, Justice Thomas frames the free
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speech issue very narrowly to only the public school system that did not exist at the founding.
His reliance on historical observations of the era surrounding the 14th Amendment is equally
problematic for the in loci parentis position of schools was not litigated as Justice Thomas
suggests.59 Thus, the concurrence’s reasoning turns largely on the author’s beliefs on a bygone
and exemplifies the problem of relying on history only for modern social inventions. If Justice
Thomas had placed his analysis into the larger sociolinguistic or cultural paradigm, there is no
doubt that his analysis would have shown that at the founding or in the late nineteenth century
what the First Amendment meant was not well understood. Thus, any conclusion of what a
student’s free speech liberties were under the First Amendment in earlier times is dubious.
The second shortcoming of originalism free speech jurisprudence is that it fails to realize
sociolinguistic changes for speech acts in schools. The in loco parentis principle espoused in the
concurrence was more than the legal doctrine Justice Thomas presupposes. It was a cultural
code on speech acts. In this code students were restricted from certain speech acts in school. The
critical problem here and with originalism in this field is that sociolinguistic speech act code of
in loci parentis is as extinct as the Latin words used to describe the doctrine. Post Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District, all municipalities have regulations based on
students having a speech act right in school.60 Moreover, this is consistent with North American
culture as studies have shown that twentieth and twentieth-first century children are taught from
birth to be self-expressive.61 Simply put, the conclusion Justice Thomas reaches that students
should not have protected speech rights in school is inconsistent with the underlying cultural
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schemata of speech in America. Although, Justice Thomas does discursively examine the
sociolinguistic features of the nineteenth century when reading academic work and case law, he
never explicitly states a connection between culture and speech acceptability. The culture
inspection Justice Thomas conducts is relevant for free speech jurisprudence, but he is confined
by originalism to the distant past.
A potential third shortcoming of free speech originalism occurs when the court makes
broad conclusions which are not supported by history. The inferences drawn by Justice
Kennedy’s opinion in Citizens United present that shortcoming.62 Toward the end of the opinion,
Justice Kennedy briefly discusses the founder’s conclusions on the First Amendment
protections.63 While conceding that “the Framers may not have anticipated modern business and
media corporation[s],” Justice Kennedy nevertheless concludes that there is no support that the
founders would support suppression of political speech by media corporations.64 In support of
this conclusion the opinion cites primarily a dissent by Justice Scalia, two concurrences by
Justice Thomas, and two books from the 1960s.65 From these sources, the majority opinion
reaches the conclusion that to the Framers culture “speech was open, comprehensive, and vital to
society’s definition of itself; there were no limits on the sources of speech and knowledge.”66
The great fault of Justice Kennedy’s reasoning is that the history and speech culture of
the Founders does not support it. The quarrel between Madison, Jefferson, and Marshall in the
Virginia House of Delegates over the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts demonstrates the
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danger of sweeping conclusions on the Founders’ Free Speech beliefs.67 Moreover, the Alien
Sedition Act was used to restrict speech acts in the press—contradicting Justice Kennedy’s
conclusions. Benjamin Franklin Bache,68 the publisher of the Philadelphia Aurora, was arrested
under the Alien and Sedition Act for his anti-federalists writings.69 Benjamin Bache was not
alone in his prosecution under the act and the arresting of publishers for political writings
demonstrates the erroneous belief in Justice Kennedy’s originalist conclusion.70 In light of these
three critical shortcomings, this theory cannot unify a modern understanding of speech act and
case law as it is restricted to earlier periods disregards large cultural changes, and can be
mistaken used to support positions which conflict with history.
B. FREE SPEECH ABSOLUTISM IGNORES A SPEECH ACTS’
SOCIOLINGUISTIC ASPECTS
Free speech absolutism’s reliance on a marketplace of ideas neglects the purpose of
speech and is unrealistic in the present culture. No one person has had as great an impact on
modern American Free speech jurisprudence as Justice Holmes. Many modern legal notions of
what is speech and case law derive from his famous Abrams v. United States dissent.71 In an oft
quoted passage from Abrams, Justice Holmes set forth the framework for a marketplace of ideas:
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Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you
have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all
your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all
opposition. To allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the
speech impotent, as when a man says that he has squared the circle, or that you do
not care whole-heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your power or
your premises. But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations
of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade
in ideas--that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution72
This vision—that speech, as a channel of expression, is valuable because brings society to the
truth-accepts the marketplace of ideas concept. Under this theory of communication, the truth
will be tested under market conditions where all opinions are debated and vetted. The free
speech absolutism this theory advocates would afford the courts little jurisdiction over speech
acts leaving the market responsible for discourse.
American free speech jurisprudence occasionally uses bombastic language in accord with
the market approaches, but it has never accepted absolutism. Since the principles asserted in
Justice Holmes’ dissent were first adopted by the Court, many restrictions have been placed on
speech.73 At no time in American jurisprudence, however, have all speech acts been permitted in
every circumstance.74 Thus, the marketplace of ideas, where truth is determined through
discourse on all ideas, is a metaphor which does not comport to reality.
In the abstract, truth discovered through the marketplace would become the accepted
reality when enough people agree that it is the truth only after inspecting all opinions. The ideal
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would function similar to the mechanics of the scientific community where all hypotheses are
subjected to rigorous testing and only then accepted. As Lawrence Solcum has noted there is a
critical distinction between the general populace and scientists: “it is one thing to contend that
open debate leads to truth among a select community of scientists and academicians, trained for
rational discourse, and quite another thing to contend that this is also true among the general
public.”75 In other words, a single parent working two jobs will have less time to muse the truths
of speech acts than a law professor. America’s recent history demonstrates that in certain issues
the market place has chosen ideas inconsistent with now accepted truths.76 Moreover, when
external forces such as wealth and control over the conduits to spread speech are consider the
idealistic presuppositions of the marketplace become obvious.
Free speech absolutism is inconsistent with the American jurisprudence and cultural
understanding of speech acts. From the country’s nascence to contemporary times, speech acts
under the ambit of common law slander and libel have been regulated. Abstractly, intellectual
property speech acts have also been regulated since 1790.77 These accepted interests contradict
the marketplace metaphor by hindering the free exchange of ideas. Furthermore, since the
founding, the American speech community has altered it perception on certain cultural speech
acts.78
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The Court’s shift in protecting speech acts once considered obscene in certain
circumstances, but still not other speech acts, contradicts free market absolutism. The test
adopted from Miller v. California, although far from perfect, evokes speech community
determinations on the acceptability of certain speech acts. 79 The famous test requires courts to
determine:
1) Whether "the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
2) Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by applicable
state law; and
3) Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.80
The Miller test, and particularly the “contemporary community standards,” requirement is
an adaptable concession to both culture and the inherent ambiguity of obscenity. Critically it is
the only free speech test used by the court which infers sociolinguistics ideas about speech acts.
The reason this standard is employed in obscenity cases and consequently speech absolutism has
never been adapted is because speech acts cannot be divorced from culture.81 Thus, free speech
absolutism and reliance on the marketplace of ideas, while a tempting theory, is not culturally
acceptable. It cannot be implemented with American jurisprudence or culture which has always
and likely will always deems certain acts unprotected.
Justice Holmes’ position assumes truth seeking is the purpose of discourse. Modern
studies of speech, unknown when Justice Holmes wrote the Abrams dissent, show speech acts
actually serve a variety of purposes. In fact, the primary purpose of speech acts is far baser than
79
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truth seeking discourse. The main objective is simply communication.82 Truth-seeking speech
acts are a subsection of linguistic communication. Indeed, many speech acts have nothing to do
with truth seeking.83 Thus, the underlying notion that truth and marketplace are the foundations
of free speech is flawed. In essence, proponents of the marketplace of ideas are defining the first
floor of the house as if it was the foundation. When inspecting the most basic purpose of speech
acts it becomes clear that discourse for truth seeking is only a subsidiary goal and explains why
certain speech acts are prohibited even after Holmes’ Abrams dissent.

C. THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH IS INHERENTLY ARBITRARY
CREATING LITIGATION AROUND THE GENUS OF SPEECH ACTS
The presently favored test applied to speech acts is the categorical approach. Under this
method, decisions are reached through a system of classifications or categories. This model does
have a historical rationale since at common law certain speech acts were granted protection or
not depending on a determination on speech’s species.84 In theory, the categorical approach
protects speech and limits “ideological predispositions”85 as outcomes can be determined at the
threshold categorical determination.86 The ACLU has concisely summarized and illustrated the
mechanisms of the classification system:
Classification systems are applied to evaluate the nature of the
speech being restricted by government, the setting where the
speech would occur, and the nature of the speech restriction. Thus,
in resolving a free speech case, a judge would determine first
82
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whether the speech at issue is ‘‘protected’’ or ‘‘unprotected’’ by
the First Amendment. Categories of ‘‘unprotected’’ speech include
obscenity, defamation, incitement, and child pornography
produced with real children. If the speech were in the ‘‘protected’’
category, the judge would classify the setting of the speech as
either some type of ‘‘public forum’’ or else a ‘‘non-public forum.’’
The judge would also classify the type of governmental speech
restriction as either ‘‘content based’’ or ‘‘content neutral.’’
Depending on the outcome of that sequence of categorical moves,
the judge would choose which category of ‘‘scrutiny’’ levels to
apply to the speech restriction, whether ‘‘strict’’ or ‘‘rational
basis’’ or a possible intermediate category.87
This system is by its very nature dependent on existing case law and the ability of judges to
relate or distinguish previous generations’ ideas on free speech.
The application of the categorical method is thus heavily dependent on a rigid application
of tests within tests. Threshold questions are designed to funnel the judiciary into a set pattern,
and portend a certain outcome. Still, the path is frequently altered. New distinctions and tests are
frequently invented to distinguish speech acts.88 Thus, what are supposed to be clear and fixed
points are malleable and susceptible to manipulation. As Kathleen Sullivan has shown, the
categorical approach and the attitude of liberal and conservative judges to it varies over time.89
The shift in the merits of the categorical approach occurs when the test begins to favor positions
which are inconsistent with the minority’s opinion.90 Above all else, the ambiguity associated
with tests within tests creates litigation concerning the categories of speech—relegating the
speech act at issue to a subsidiary concern.
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The categorical approach does not deal with the underlying cultural assumptions that
attend the perception of speech, and does not substantially delve into the rationale behind the
categories it creates. Moreover, the approach does not explain the underlying assumptions of
categorical creation. For instance, there is a cultural speech act assumption behind Justice
Thomas’s rejection of the student free speech category, and the one behind his acceptance of the
political speech doctrine. The underlying assumptions are the sociolinguistic attitudes of the
judiciary. Therefore, in controversial issues a liberal justice is more likely to categorize laws
regulating abortion protesters as ‘‘content-neutral,’’ where a conservative justice would assign
them to the ‘‘content-based’ category of speech restrictions. Determining whether a speech act is
content-neutral or content-based speech does not comport to the complete linguistic
understanding of a speech act, yet the determination of this factor is crucial to the categorical
test.
D. THE PRESENT BALANCE APPROACH LACKS A
SOCIOLINGUISTIC ANALYSIS
The alternative test used post-Abrams is the balancing test. Like the categorical
approach, balancing has been subject to much criticism from both liberal and conservative forces
over the past hundred years.91 A historical basis for balancing can be found in Judge
Blackstone’s amorphous and broad description of protected speech acts balanced against speech
acts affecting the states which are not protected.92 The balancing tests used by the Court have
two major shortcomings. The first shortcoming is that when the balancing test has been used by
courts its determining factors have not been uniformly applied to different types of speech.
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Despite the variance between balancing tests, the public speech test set forth in Pickering
v. Board of Education shows the general characteristics shared by the various free speech
balancing tests.93 There, a public school teacher was dismissed after writing a letter to newspaper
which criticized how the Township Board of Education and the district superintendent had
handled past proposals to raise new revenue for the school system.94 The Court opined that the
teacher’s first amendment rights were violated. The test conducted by the Court required that the
employee's free speech rights be balanced against the public employer's interest in operational
efficiency.95
The free speech balancing approach factors the interests of the speaker against any
legitimate government interests, however the test does not necessitate an analysis of the speech
act in each case. The balancing approach, which rose to prevalence in the twentieth century,
generally did not require courts to inspect the sociolinguistic components of speech.96 For
example, Pickering began its analysis of the speech act at issue by inspecting the school
regulation which was violated—not what the speech itself.97 There, the Court’s touchstone of
speech analysis was “the public interest in having free and unhindered debate on matters of
public importance-the core value of the Free Speech Clause.”98 Thus, the court presupposed a
cultural schema on which to balance the public and private interests. That presupposition
permitted the court to balance the speech act in question without analyzing the particularities of

93

Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
Id. at 567.
95
Joseph O. Oluwole, The Pickering Balancing Test and Public Employment-Free Speech Jurisprudence: The
Approaches of Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 133 (2008).
96
The Miller Test is the exception. This too has been subject to manipulation through statute. OWEN M. FISS, STATE
ACTIVISM AND STATE CENSORSHIP, 100 YALE L.J. 2087, 2093 (1991) (describing the Helms Amendment to the
National Endowment of the Arts, which limited the ability of museums to display certain types of controversial art
while incorporating the third prong of the Miller test into the amendment).
97
Pickering at 568.
98
Id. at 573.
94

Curreri 24

the speech act itself. In parts III and IV of the opinion, where the Court made its determination
that the speech is protected under the First Amendment, its inspection of the speech act is limited
to its veracity.99 Balancing tests such as this are too shallow in the analysis of the speech act and
can be as arbitrary as the categorical approach.
The second shortcoming of the balancing test is the propensity to find that the
government interests overwhelm speech acts which would normally be protected under a
categorical approach. Political speech which is fiercely protected under the categorical
approach, can be overwhelmed by government interests under the balancing approach.100 The
case to epitomize the potential danger of balancing free speech against a government interest is
Dennis v. United States.101 There, in a political speech case, the Court balked at protecting the
rights of an extreme minority. The Dennis defendants were leading members of the Communist
Party in the United States, during the height of the Red Scare.102 They were found guilty of
“assembl[ing] persons who teach and advocate the overthrow and destruction of the Government
of the United States by force and violence.”103 However, at trial no evidence was proffered
showing an active plot to overthrow the government.104 The plurality opined that through case
law the government had a “substantial enough interest” in protecting itself that it can limit
speech which engenders armed internal attack.105
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Without using the word balance, the plurality found that the government interest
warranted the guilty verdict even though there was no overt act of insurrection proved at the
Trial Court.106 The majority’s decision to find such speech unprotected highlights the danger of
using balancing tests which do not have set factors.107 It gives courts expansive power to
determine what interests are to be balanced, and in times of war allows judges to bend to
increased pressure to weigh the government interests’ substantially.108 As a result of this power,
the balancing test which prescribed lets the court succumb to external pressures.109
IV.

CONTEMPORY SOCIOLINGUISTIC CULTURAL UNDERSTANDINGS
MUST BE REVIEWED WHEN ANALYZING FREE SPEECH

All of the previously discussed theories are in tension with and cannot adequately explain
American free speech jurisprudence. While earlier theories and tests have failed to satisfactorily
elucidate why certain speech acts are protected and others are not, that should not be taken to
mean one is impossible or unnecessary. The underlying concern those theories face is a failure
to realize the purpose of speech acts and the science that can now support them. The primary
function of speech is communication. A speech act includes the speaker, the hearer, and the
context of the utterance.110 Under those basic tenets a speech act has a locutionary act,
prelocutionary act, illocutionary effect, and the culture groups unwritten sociolinguistic codes on
what is appropriate in a given context. It is essential that courts take notice of those three
functions in context if they are to do justice to an assessment of a given form of expressions
meaning.
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Against a lens of sociolinguistic inquiry, originalism fails to present a convincing free
speech jurisprudence for three reasons. First, the framers did not have access to the
sociolinguistics science. They could not agree on what free speech was, and did not build in
cultural referents. For instance, the founders’ culture would not have permitted deception of a
obscene pornographic speech act, but the present American culture and its jurisprudence does.
Similarly, free market absolutism has never been adopted for it is incompatible with basic
American sociolinguistic norms. Namely, American culture groups do not want the government
to use its voice to discriminate on speech111 or allow people to shout fire in a crowded theater.112
Because of these cultural distinctions the categorical approach, which does not protect these
speech acts, at first blush appears wise. However, the categorical system creates arbitrarily
created levels of protection for different speech acts, and forces litigants to debate whether a
speech act is in a particular subcategory. The balancing approach is equally unavailing as it can
easily find a state interest that overwhelms a speech act that would normally be protected and
could produce results contra to American sociolinguistic cues. All of these failures need to be
addressed by any theory or test which purports to cover American free speech. Any test or
theory which would accomplish this task must analysis the underlying sociolinguistic
components of speech.
A modified factor-based balancing test is the best approach to add a sociolinguistic
component to free speech jurisprudence. The balancing approach is a better solution than the
categorical approach for it does not suffer the arbitrary creation of subcategories and their related
tests. The categorical approach encourages reliance on stare decisis to decide cultural norms.
Moreover, it requires litigation on the species of category, which would detract from an analysis
111
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of the various features of speech acts below the surface. Conversely, a factor based balancing test
requires an intense inspection of case’s facts. When applying linguistic features to the balancing
test, the Court will have greater discretion to review the individual speech act in its specific
contexts. Using a balancing test for sociolinguistic factors also harkens back to Blackstone’s
conclusion that certain “blasphemous, immoral, treasonable, schismatical, seditious, or
scandalous libels” would not be protected.113 Unbeknownst to Blackstone, his ambiguous
exceptions to free speech require interpretations of various sociolinguistic features of the speech
community. This analysis in particular requires a careful approach, one in which a balancing test
is uniquely suited.
To combat a ruling similar to Dennis, where political speech during a time of political
strife was stifled, the factor based balancing test must overwhelmingly support free speech. The
proposed test requires the court to find:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

who conducted the speech act;
what the intent of the speech act was;
whether the medium used was the normal channel for such an act;
what speech act’s effects were both intentional and unintentional;
whether contemporary society recognizes or is prepared to recognize all the components
which comprise the act. There recognition would signal to the Court that the speech act
should be protected;114
6) whether the speech act occurred in a subculture which recognized or is it prepared to
recognize all the components which comprise the act, thereby signaling to the Court the
speech act should receive at least intermediate scrutiny or deference when no overt act
has occurred;
113
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7) All these factors would then be balanced against any narrowly tailored state interests for
prohibiting the speech act, which may exist. The burden would be on the government to
overcome the presumed free speech right.

Under this multi-factored test, the court is required to closely examine the components which
create a speech act. This is critical because examining the mechanisms of speech makes the court
acknowledge the workings of speech which are often forgotten by courts. Basing the test on the
components of speech is important because it makes the court carefully inspect the actual act and
it brings the speech act to the forefront of free speech analysis. Furthermore, the test brings
sociolinguistics to free speech analysis for the first time and ties speech acts with the community
itself. By limiting the cultural factor to contemporary communities and sub-communities the
court is required to examine present currents in American society and its various subcultures.
This protects the majority from subjugation to moral or cultural attitudes from distant periods.
This analysis also protects minority subcultures from being examined under the penumbra of
the majority culture. Assuming arguendo, that Citizens United would remain good law, the
Court’s recent rejection of Montana’s argument to maintain its campaign laws in American
Trade Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock, may have been decided differently under the proposed test.115
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United, Montana went to great lengths to
preserve a 100 year old statute on campaign donor restrictions.116 The Montana Supreme Court
noted that before the law the government had only “a mere shell of legal authority,” and the state
was controlled by corporations.117 The Montana Supreme Court believed the state with its sparse
population and large geographic size had unique and compelling interests which distinguished
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the Montana statute from Citizens United.118 In a one paragraph per curiam opinion, the United
States Supreme Court disagreed ,opining there is no “serious doubt” that Montana’ arguments
were rejected in Citizens United or failed to meaningfully distinguish that case.119
Under the proposed test Montana’s arguments would be more availing because it directly
inspects minority speech communities. The sixth factor of the test, whether the speech act
occurred in a subculture which recognized the right, which would require at least intermediate
scrutiny would be applied. Several factors would weigh in favor of Montana. First, the statute
was originally enacted in 1912, and reenacted several times thereafter. 120 This demonstrates a
long and held belief of Montanans that certain campaign restrictions in the state are important.
Secondly, Montana’s unique cultural history shows the difficulties a large state with a small
population can have when corporations have unfettered access to political speech. Montanan’s
present political speech culture had grown under this law for a multiple generations. In essence,
these critical facts demonstrate that Montana has unique and long held limitations on political
speech by corporations as “bad speech.” This determination by Montanans is a distinctive
sociolinguistic feature of political speech in Montana. In light of these critical facts that
distinguish Montana from states such as California or New Jersey, and under the proposed test a
unique ruling could be crafted which respected Montana’s sociolinguistic features where some
limitations on corporate political speech could be upheld. In the very least under the proposed
test Montana would have been afforded a higher level of scrutiny and the Court would have to
examine the features of political speech in the Montana speech community.
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The proposed test makes the government’s burden to restrain free speech high even under
a balancing test. In order to sustain a restriction on speech, the government interest would have
to be both substantial and legitimate. In American free speech, restrictions in the political arena
have often been upheld against minority political positions.121 Those decisions have often faced
considerable criticism. Under the substantial government interest test the state would face
sufficient judicial scrutiny making cases akin to Dennis likely to go the other way.
A hypothetical application of Dennis under the proposed test under would protect the
speech act. In Dennis, the defendant was alleged to be a leader of the Communists Political
Association and involved, although there was no evidence of a direct plan, with plotting to
overthrow the United States government.122 Applying those facts to the proposed test the
government would not have sustained its burden to curtail his free speech. The Court would
consider several factors relating to the actual speech act: First, Dennis was the speaker of a
political speech act which threatened to overthrow the government via his oral statements and
written publications. Second that his intent was to communicate his message that the
government of the United States must be over thrown. Thirdly, that speech acts which try to
persuade people to a political point normally use oral and printed means as Dennis did.
Additionally the Court would acknowledge that the effects of his speech acts have been minimal
as he had relatively few listeners and there was no active plan to overthrow the American
government. Finally, the court would consider that contemporary American society accepts
political discourse it does not agree with. All of these factors would then be balanced against the
alleged government’s narrowly tailored state interests. Under the facts of Dennis, the
government has a substantial interest in self preservation. It also has an interest in protecting the
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public interest.123 But the government maintains a burden to show how this particular speech act
is dangerous and that the prohibition of speech is narrowly tailored to its action. The
government’s interest in stifling Dennis’ and his compatriots’ speech liberties would likely lost
against their speech liberty as the threat of insurrection posed by the group is minimal and the
restraint of speech acts is extreme in American culture.
Conversely, under this test speech acts such as child pornography still would not be
protected. In New York v. Ferber, the Court wisely found that distributing child pornography
was not protected under the First Amendment.124 The Court balanced the speech issue involved
with child pornography and the government’s interest in protecting children finding the
government’s interest “heav[y] and persuasiv[e].”125 Specifically, the Court found that the Miller
test did not apply, advertising encourages the act, the distribution has little if any value, and the
government’s interest clearly balanced against the defendant’s speech act right.126
Under the proposed test the Court would reach the same result, but would consider the
rationale behind the Court’s dismissal. Thus, the Court would establish that Ferber as a
distributor was communicating a speech act, his intent was to make a profit through the
distribution of the speech act, the medium employed is commonly used to distribute such goods,
the effects of the speech are the profiting from the endangerment of children. Then the court
would find that in American speech communities the majority and minority do not recognize the
act as acceptable. These factors would be balanced against the narrowly tailored but critical state
interest in protecting children. If there was a minor perverse community that did recognize the
act as acceptable, the heavy and persuasive government interests would overcome the minority
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interest. Thus under this test, the Court would reach the same conclusion as the Ferber Court.
The underlying reason behind the Court dismissal of Ferber’s claim is American culture never
accepted this speech act as appropriate.
The areas in which a factor based balancing test would be more effective in protecting
speech rights are in perilous times and outrageous speech acts. Often criticized cases like Dennis
and Abrams occurred during moments of internal and external discord in America.127 Since the
September 11th terrorist attacks, several scholars have noted the impact of the war on terror has
had on civil liberties.128 The proposed multifactor balancing test would better protect civil
liberties for it is less deferential to previous assessments and requires an in-depth analysis of the
speech act at issue and the speech community.
Foe example, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project dealt with the conflict between
American free speech values and legislation amended after September 11th terrorist attacks.129
The Court, in a 6-3 decision, found that the restrictions placed on speech and association by 18
U.S.C. § 2339B130 did not violate the First Amendment.131 Before examining the speech acts at
issue the Court cast the question narrowly as “whether the Government may prohibit what
127
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plaintiffs want to do—provide material support to the PKK132 and LTTE133 in the form of
speech.”134 Defining the issue in such a manner where the intent of the speaker is predetermined
by the adjudicator, here that the plaintiff wanted to provide material support when that was at
issue, defeats the analysis of the speech act. The question as framed presupposes both the
government’s interest in stopping the speech and the Humanitarian Law Projections purpose in
their challenge to the law.
Applying the proposed test to that case, the speech was conducted by United States
citizens, which have well established First Amendment rights.135 The intent of the act was to
facilitate lawful nonviolent purposes for groups deemed foreign terrorist organizations, the
legality and scope of which are at issue. The medium to be used by the citizens was “in the form
of monetary contributions, other tangible aid, legal training, and political advocacy,” channels of
speech which would normally be protected.136 The effects of the speech in that case are difficult
to ascertain, as the plaintiffs never actually did the speech acts at issue in the case.137 Assuming
that the Humanitarian Law Projects had helped the organizations at issue, it could have affected
the groups’ political status. Similarly, the unintended effect of money’s fungibility must also be
accounted for here to be later balanced against the speech act.138
The question of whether contemporary society or a subculture recognizes or is prepared
to recognize all the components which comprise the act would next be analyzed. Here, all the
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aforementioned factors and any evidence of cultural norms concerning the speech acts in
question would be considered. This would be the most difficult determination for the Court to
make as a finding that no American cultural groups recognize the speech act at issue as
acceptable would likely doom plaintiff’s case. In this instance, the fact that several groups filed
amici currae briefs supporting both parties shows that at least some groups supported the speech
act.139 Likely the speech at issue would be afforded strict scrutiny because the underlying culture
surrounding political speech is strong.140 The speech act would then be balanced against the
state’s legitimate interests which in this case include: the government’s interest in combating
terrorism; how legitimacy makes it easier for these groups to persist; the fungibility of money;
and the potential damage to the relationship between the United States and its allies.141
The various facts and competing interests in Holder v. Humanitarian Aid make it one of
the more difficult fact patterns to apply the factor based balancing test. If the factor balancing
test were used it would likely afford the speaker a greater right of association than the holding in
the case. Under this test, the Court could find a middle road and protect the culture of
communication while restricting the flow of money to the organizations. This could be a better
result than the holding in Holder v. Humanitarian Aid because it would not allow the
government to arrest citizens for engaging in coordinated teaching and advocacy which furthers
the designated organizations' lawful political objectives. Arresting United States citizens for
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teaching members of groups like the PKK to petition the UN, an entity which exists so groups
can settle their differences peacefully, maybe more aligned with American sociolinguistic
features.
This test would not overrule most existing case law; rather it explicitly states the
underlying cultural evaluations beneath existing case law. Judges are equipped to make such
determinations because the wealth of information available to them in the twenty-first century
affords courts the opportunity to examine details of American culture that were not possible
before.142 Furthermore, Courts have effectively made cultural determinations based on the
species of speech worthy of protection in the categorical approach. For example, the Court has
stated that political speech is culturally important for democracy and receives the highest levels
of protection.143 Conversely, child pornography is not protected because the speech community
has determined that it is wrong in all circumstances and a dialogue, outside academia, is not
welcomed. Similarly, American speech communities do not accept libel or slander of
individuals while at the same time acknowledging a limited protection from deformation for
newspapers.144 While conversely, speech actors like the Westborough Baptist Church receive
protection despite the vast majority of the speech community condemning the action itself. The
proposed test does compel the Court to review present conditions in society instead of
interpreting the conflicting and ambiguous opinions of the founding fathers—whose cultural
experience no longer exists. Alleviating the confines of speech communities which are extinct
would likely lower the hold of precedent and instead focus the determination on the speech act
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before them. The factors in the proposed test oblige the court to fully analyze the speech act at
issue in each case on its own merits. This is well beyond what the current approaches requires
and allows the court to concentrate on the speech act instead of a judicially created category and
its associated tests. In perilous times, when speech cases are the most difficult, a cultural
evaluation would reinforce a broader analysis of the First Amendment.
IV.

POTENTIAL SHORTCOMINGS OF THE PROPOSED TEST AND A
SHIFT TO LINGUISTIC-ORIENTED ANALYSIS

Any test for free speech and its underlying theory will undoubtedly have certain
drawbacks. Unlike the existing theories and tests, the shortcomings of the factored balancing
and sociolinguistic approach are not its inability to explain the contours of present American
jurisprudence like the market theory or the ambiguities of originalsim. The scientific
understanding to inform a linguistics’ speech act approach did not exist in 1790. Webster’s
dictionary, the oft-cited American dictionary, was still relying on Scripture to explain speech and
language in the nineteenth century.145 Moreover, the sociolinguistic aspects of speech were not
truly studied until the 1960s. Therefore, it cannot be said this test reflects anything close to what
the founding fathers consciously understood speech to be. This should not be determinative
though for science is critical to understanding what speech is, and to hold jurisprudence to a
eighteenth century understanding or rationale is nonsensical in this context.

Webster’s original dictionary begins with a definition and origin of language. It uses the Bible to describe the
origin of language:
Language or speech is the utterance of articulate sounds or voices, rendered
significant by usage, for the expression and communication of thoughts. While
this understands several linguistic concepts he goes on to say on the origin of
language: that “vocal sounds or words were used in these communications
between God and the progenitors of the human race.”
I WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, i (1828).
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A criticism that warrants more attention is the power the proposed test gives the Court to
make partially subjective determinations on culture.146 As Justice O’Connor stated about the
second prong of the Katz test, which also examines what American culture is willing to accept,
“We have no talisman that determines in all cases those privacy expectations that society is
prepared to accept as reasonable.” The test this paper proposes asks the Court to make a similar
determination; however, the talisman does exist in the speech act context. What is and is not
protected speech is often marked by the speech community. The wrong use of words or topic
inside a speech community marks an individual as either not belonging to the community or
challenging the community’s schema on what is acceptable speech. In order to get a satisfying
conclusion, the Court must also consider the speech act broadly, i.e. does the community accept
speech acts concerning government—not whether the community accepts the speech acts of a
disfavored group.
In order for the Court to determine what the speech community accepts, it can accept
evidence via judicial notice for larger determinations and experts for more nuanced issue.
Judicial notice is an ancient doctrine of common law and one that “promotes judicial efficiency
by avoiding the expenditure of time and effort involved in adducing unnecessary evidence.”147
In fact, the United States Supreme Court has used judicial notice in the past for cultural events
and the impact of those events on citizens.148 Furthermore, the Court has opined that its
application of judicial notice does not preclude an opposing party from proffering evidence to
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counter that fact.149 For a case like American Trade Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock, the Court
should, as the Montana Supreme Court did, look to several sources which show the attitudes of
the speech community.150 When doing this analysis the Court can also rely on expert witness
testimony and amicus briefs which analyses how speech is actually being used in American
communities and the mediums being used to communicate.
Another aspect of cultural protections which has been addressed in criminal defense is
the potential for schisms in protections. An issue could arise where a minority group protects a
certain speech act and the majority does not.151 For example in the criminal context, in People
v. Aphaylath, a Laotian refugee, who was convicted of killing his wife, was permitted to use
evidence of culture for his defendant's extreme emotional disturbance defense.152 The New York
Court of Appeals, allowed cultural evidence that because the man’s wife had received calls from
a single man it could have “[brought] shame on defendant and his family sufficient to trigger
defendant's loss of control.”153 Because culture has been used as a mitigating defense for crimes
its application in criminal law has been controversial.154
In the First Amendment context, under the proposed test a court could face an issue
where a member of the majority conducts the same speech act that is protected for a minority or
where a minority conducts a speech act which is not protected for the majority but is respected
by the minority. The later issue has been addressed in the analysis of American Trade
149
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Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock, but the former is a different situation where a court would have to
determine if the majority could make use of the protection afforded to the minority.155 This is a
legitimate concern, but one which can be overcome. In this situation, when the court initially
finds minority speech community’s act protected, the court may provide the majority the lower
level of protection which was given to the minority.156 Hypothetically, if the Court had accepted
Montana’s argument it was a unique area and that because its laws still allowed political
committees to be formed and maintained by filing its law was constitutional, New Jersey could
draft a similar law and attempt to get the same deference.157 Here, if the Court were to give New
Jersey the same deference as Montana, the protection would work similarly to a downgrade in a
criminal offense.
The proposed multi-factored balancing test overcomes the deficiencies of previous
balancing tests because the new tests factors are set and purposely favor speech protection. As
the criticism of Dennis suggests, in a balancing test a government interest could be held so
overwhelming as to override any particular speech act. Moreover because the test used in
Dennis did not have definitive factors, the factors of the test were ill-defined and subject to
manipulation. To address this problem, the proposed test is designed to weigh heavily in favor of
allowing speech and not restricting it. The factors used to determine the speech act are purposely
inclusive, requiring the court to determine several features which support the protection of the
speech act. Americans generally favor free speech. Thus the balancing of these factors against
the required substantial government creates a significant hurdle for speech restriction. Moreover,
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the critical benefit of this test is that the cultural elements it addresses help to explain of the
given speech like no existing test, and will allow the growth of future free speech cases to be
informed by the current understandings of American communities.
V.

CONCLUSION

The components of speech were poorly understood in the founding era. Consequently,
the theories derived from the limited knowledge of speech were misinformed. The present study
of linguistics shows that speech is a much larger field than the founding fathers understood.
Speech acts comprise both mechanical and social components which are marked as relevant by
the speech communities. The social aspect of speech is critical to free speech jurisprudence and
helps to explains the disparate and sometimes conflicting reasoning of American case law.
American free speech jurisprudence has defied a theory and test which adequately
explains the various case law doctrines. Originalism fails for there was no consensus on free
speech in the 1790s, and its application fails to consider cultural changes in the past two hundred
years. Free speech absolutism and the market place of ideas has never been accepted in all areas.
The categorical approach also fails for it creates arbitrary groupings of speech and adjudicates
speech acts in relation to precedent rather than the speech act at issues own merits. Finally, the
present balancing approach is too malleable with ill defined contours and subject to the same
issue as the categorical approach.
Using linguistic theory, this paper demonstrates the worthiness of a factor based
balancing test that examines the components of speech acts to explain the underlying rationale of
current case law. The proposed test requires courts to inspect the “speech” component of free
speech jurisprudence in great detail. The test necessitates an inspection of whether contemporary
community standards acknowledge the speech act. Only after the speech act has been understood
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in its context and the context of the larger community itself does the court balance the speech act
against any narrowly tailored state interests that may exist. The purpose of speech is
communication and this test brings that key component of language where it belongs at the
forefront of American free speech jurisprudence.

